Between the Dragon and the Eagle, Africa Must Learn to Fly

By Aksah Italo
Published on 02/19/26

Great powers seldom admit that they are pursuing ambition. They prefer the language of partnership, friendship and mutual benefit. Yet behind the choreography of summits and the careful phrasing of communiqués lies something more straightforward. A strategic interest.

Africa now finds itself at the centre of a renewed geopolitical contest. The United States and China approach the continent with different tools but similar resolve. Washington advances the vocabulary of markets, governance and private capital. Beijing deploys infrastructure finance, industrial capacity and state backed speed. Both frame their engagement as opportunity.

The scale of China’s rise in Africa is unmistakable. In 2000, trade between China and the continent stood at roughly 10 billion dollars. By 2023 it exceeded 280 billion dollars annually, according to Chinese customs data.

China has been Africa’s largest trading partner since 2009, overtaking the United States and the European Union in bilateral goods trade. Chinese companies have built highways in Kenya, railways in Ethiopia, ports in West Africa and power plants across the continent. The presence is visible in steel and concrete.

By comparison, total trade between the United States and Africa has hovered around 70 to 80 billion dollars annually in recent years.

America’s flagship economic instrument remains the African Growth and Opportunity Act, enacted in 2000, which provides duty free access to the US market for thousands of eligible African products.

AGOA has supported apparel exports from Kenya and Lesotho and, before its suspension, underpinned Ethiopia’s garment industry. Yet AGOA is a trade preference regime, not an infrastructure strategy. It offers access rather than assets.

China offers assets. Through the Forum on China Africa Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing has financed and constructed transport corridors, ports, power generation facilities and telecommunications networks.

Data from the China Africa Research Initiative at Johns Hopkins University show that Chinese lenders have committed more than 150 billion dollars in loans to African governments and state owned enterprises since 2000. These loans have accelerated infrastructure development in countries long constrained by capital shortages. They have also increased external debt burdens in several cases, contributing to restructuring negotiations in countries such as Zambia and Ethiopia.

Trade patterns reveal the structural asymmetry embedded in these relationships. In the first eight months of last year, African exports to China totalled approximately 81 billion dollars, while imports from China reached nearly 141 billion dollars.

The resulting trade deficit of around 60 billion dollars reflects a familiar pattern. Africa exports oil from Nigeria and Angola, copper from Zambia, cobalt from the Democratic Republic of Congo and iron ore from South Africa. It imports machinery, electronics, vehicles, textiles and increasingly digital infrastructure.

The composition of trade with the United States differs but remains concentrated. American imports from Africa are dominated by crude oil and a narrow set of commodities.

Non oil exports, aside from apparel and a handful of agricultural products, remain modest. The promise of diversification has proved more difficult than the rhetoric of preference.

American policymakers have acknowledged the need for recalibration. President Donald Trump has framed the US approach as a pivot from aid to commerce, arguing that “trade would be more sustainable than traditional assistance”. The underlying recognition is clear. China’s economic footprint in Africa cannot be countered through diplomacy alone. It requires competitive investment and credible market access.

China’s leadership presents its engagement as solidarity among developing economies. President Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasised that China supports Africa’s development and views economic globalization as an “irreversible” trend in which countries of the Global South must share.

Beijing has expanded zero tariff treatment for many African exports and continues to promote industrial cooperation. Yet the headline figures suggest that market access alone has not eliminated imbalances.

So which partnership is more strategically valuable for Africa?

China’s advantage lies in immediacy and scale. Kenya’s Standard Gauge Railway, Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa Djibouti rail corridor and multiple port expansions were executed with Chinese financing and engineering. Infrastructure reduces transport costs, integrates markets and can raise productivity. For rapidly urbanising economies with infrastructure gaps estimated by the African Development BanBk(AFD) at 68 to 108 billion dollars annually, such investment is not trivial.

America’s advantage lies in the depth of its financial markets, technological ecosystem and institutional frameworks. The United States remains one of the world’s largest consumer markets and a hub for capital formation. Integration into US anchored value chains can provide African firms with access to advanced technology, regulatory standards and long term investment. American multinational companies often embed governance and compliance systems that strengthen domestic institutional capacity.

Yet value is not defined solely by what is offered. It is defined by what is retained

Economist Kebour Ghenna has argued that African countries must approach external financing strategically, ensuring that foreign loans and trade agreements strengthen domestic productive capacity rather than entrench commodity dependence. The critical question is not whether the partner is Chinese or American. It is whether Africa builds manufacturing capacity alongside infrastructure, skills alongside ports and competitive industries alongside extraction.

Country experiences illustrate both progress and constraint. Ethiopia’s Chinese financed industrial parks have generated manufacturing employment and export capacity, but the sustainability of that model depends on foreign exchange earnings sufficient to service debt.

Nigeria, despite being Africa’s largest economy, remains heavily reliant on oil exports even as it expands trade ties with both Beijing and Washington. South Africa enjoys diversified trade with China and longstanding financial integration with Western markets, yet continues to grapple with structural unemployment exceeding 30 percent.

Africa is not being forced to choose between the Dragon and the Eagle. It is being courted by both. The strategic risk lies not in engagement but in passivity. Preferential tariffs do not substitute for industrial policy. Infrastructure loans do not guarantee economic transformation. Trade deficits do not close without deliberate upgrading of domestic production.

The African Continental Free Trade Area offers a potential counterweight. Intra African trade still accounts for less than 20 percent of total African commerce, far below levels in Europe or Asia. A more integrated continental market of 1.3 billion people would strengthen bargaining power with external partners and support regional value chains. Collective negotiation carries more weight than fragmented diplomacy.

Ultimately, the debate over whether China or the United States is more valuable obscures a deeper truth. External partnerships can accelerate development, but they cannot define it. Africa’s leverage derives from competition between great powers. Its sovereignty depends on domestic policy discipline, regional integration and structural transformation.

Great powers will continue to describe their ambitions as friendship. Africa’s challenge is to translate opportunity into capacity and competition into autonomy. Between the Dragon and the Eagle, the continent’s future will depend less on whom it entertains and more on how firmly it steers its own course.