Inside Mohammed Al-Amoudi’s Absence and the Afterlife of Power

By Aksah Italo
Published on 01/19/26

More than eight years ago, Mohammed Hussein Al-Amoudi disappeared from public view after being taken to the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh alongside dozens of Saudi princes, and ministers.

What began in November 2017 as a dramatic overnight detention quickly became one of the most consequential anti-corruption purges in modern Saudi history, reshaping elite power structures inside the kingdom.

For months, uncertainty surrounded Al-Amoudi’s fate. Rumors circulated about his health, his wealth, even whether he remained alive. With Saudi authorities offering no official explanation, speculation filled the vacuum.

After more than 400 days in detention, confirmation finally came. Al-Amoudi was being held by Saudi authorities as part of corruption and bribery investigations. No charges were publicly disclosed. No court proceedings were announced.

Then, when he was finally released in January 2019, no explanation was given for either his detention or his freedom.

The episode sent shockwaves far beyond Saudi Arabia. No other country watched more closely than Ethiopia.

By the time of his detention, Al-Amoudi had become Ethiopia’s single largest foreign investor, with billions of dollars committed across mining, manufacturing, agriculture, construction, energy, healthcare, and real estate. No other individual investor came close to matching his economic footprint.

His companies employed more than 100,000 Ethiopians roughly 14 percent of the country’s formal private-sector workforce.

His MIDROC Investment Group dominated industrial-scale gold mining, held stakes in steel and cement production, controlled major food and beverage manufacturers, and played a central role in Ethiopia’s post-1991 privatization drive.

That reality explains why his detention triggered immediate concern among policymakers, investors, and analysts. The fear was not simply about one individual’s liberty, but about what his absence revealed: an economy unusually dependent on a narrow group of large investors.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed made Al-Amoudi’s case a diplomatic priority soon after taking office. In 2018, he personally appealed to Saudi officials for the tycoon’s release, an extraordinary intervention that revealed how deeply Al-Amoudi’s businesses were embedded in Ethiopia’s economy.

Such high-level advocacy was unusual, but revealing.

Contrary to early fears, much of Al-Amoudi’s global business empire proved resilient during his detention.

In Europe, his Sweden-based oil refiner Preem AB recorded sales growth of more than 30 percent during the period. His Stockholm real-estate portfolio appreciated in value, benefiting from stable regulation, deep capital markets, and institutional continuity. These assets continued to perform with little disruption, managed by professional teams operating in predictable environments.

In Ethiopia, outcomes were more mixed.

Some operations continued to function, largely because management authority had long been delegated. MIDROC Investment Group led by long-time associate Jemal Ahmed maintained activity across multiple sectors.

In mining, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction, operations continued, though often cautiously.

Other businesses, however, struggled under the combined pressures of macroeconomic stress, foreign-exchange shortages, and the absence of direct owner oversight.

One of the most visible examples was Moha Soft Drinks Industry S.C., Ethiopia’s largest beverage bottler and a long-standing licensee of PepsiCo brands. Established more than two decades earlier, Moha had become a household name, operating eight bottling plants across the country.

By 2024, Moha found itself in crisis. Ethiopia’s chronic foreign-currency shortages made it increasingly difficult to import concentrate, and packaging materials. Production was halted across all eight plants. Warnings of potential contract termination followed, highlighting how quickly even established firms could slide into distress amid liquidity constraints and operational uncertainty.

The Moha episode illustrated a broader pattern; when owner-dependent conglomerates face external shocks, the ripple effects can be swift and severe.

In response, Al-Amoudi moved from afar to integrate Moha more formally into the MIDROC portfolio. The consolidation aimed to stabilize financing, restructure management, and restore production of international brands such as Pepsi and Mirinda.

To understand why Al-Amoudi’s absence matters so deeply, one must understand how central he has been to Ethiopia’s economic trajectory since the early 1990s.

Born in Ethiopia in 1946, Al-Amoudi grew up during a period marked by economic hardship and political upheaval. At the age of 18, he left the country for Saudi Arabia, taking Saudi citizenship and beginning his career as a construction worker. Over time, he climbed the ranks of the construction industry, benefiting from government contracts during Saudi Arabia’s infrastructure boom.

In the early 1980s, he founded MIDROC (Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies) a conglomerate that would later expand into energy, infrastructure, mining, and heavy industry.

His return to Ethiopia in the mid-1990s followed the fall of the Derg regime and the rise of the EPRDF-led government. That period marked the beginning of Ethiopia’s privatization drive, as the state sought to attract private capital to rebuild an economy damaged by decades of conflict and central planning.

Al-Amoudi emerged as the single most important participant in that process.

According to government records and academic studies, his companies acquired an estimated 80 percent of the total value of privatized enterprises. In some sectors, MIDROC became effectively dominant.

The Lega Dembi gold mine was acquired in 1997 for approximately 172 million dollars, it remains Ethiopia’s largest industrial gold operation. In certain fiscal years such as 2013/14 MIDROC reportedly accounted for roughly 40 percent of extractive-sector government revenue, generating more than 150 million dollars annually. 

Beyond mining, Al-Amoudi invested heavily in steel, cement, agriculture, healthcare, education, real estate, and manufacturing. His investments helped accelerate industrial activity, expand formal employment, and boost export earnings at a time when Ethiopia had few alternative sources of large-scale private capital.

Yet his scale also created concentration risk.

Economic research has long warned that while foreign direct investment (FDI) can accelerate growth, excessive concentration among a few investors increases vulnerability.

Studies by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) show that low-income countries with highly concentrated FDI experience sharper investment contractions during political or financial shocks.  

It shows that, when dominant investors withdraw, delay projects, or face legal trouble, the impact on employment, exports, and fiscal revenue can be immediate.

UN data reveal that in many developing economies, the top five investors account for more than half of total FDI stock.

 In sub-Saharan Africa, this concentration is often even higher, particularly in extractive industries. 

World Bank firm-level studies further show that owner-dependent conglomerates face higher operational risk when governance structures are weak or centralized.

This fits Ethiopia perfectly. By the late 2010s, Al-Amoudi alone accounted for a significant share of Ethiopia’s industrial output, export earnings, and private employment. His detention therefore functioned as a stress test, revealing how exposed the economy was to shocks affecting a single individual.

The suspension of mining operations between 2018 and 2021, officially attributed to environmental concerns coincided with his detention and its aftermath. 

While regulatory oversight was justified, the timing shows how governance actions and investor-specific shocks can compound one another.

Al-Amoudi’s continued low profile. Many detainees in Saudi Arabia were reportedly freed only after opaque financial settlements, potentially limiting liquidity and asset control. 

For a capital-intensive investor, reduced financial flexibility constrains the ability to expand, refinance, or defend large projects particularly in high-risk environments.

Rather than disengaging, Al-Amoudi appears to have adapted. He has delegated authority, consolidated operations, and avoided public exposure. Ownership remains intact, but day-to-day visibility is minimized. Al-Amoudi’s story is ultimately less about one man than about a development model.

For decades, Ethiopia relied on a small group of  investors to drive industrialization. That approach delivered results;  jobs, exports, infrastructure, and fiscal revenue. But it also created fragility.

When shocks hit whether political, legal, or financial the ripple effects spread quickly through employment, production, and government revenue.

Investment experts argue that Ethiopia’s next phase of growth requires diversification;  more investors, stronger institutions, deeper capital markets, and governance structures that allow firms to survive beyond their founders.

As Worku Lemma, an investment analyst, notes, Ethiopia has long depended on a handful of large investors, making growth sensitive to individual shocks. Owner-dependent companies, he warns, face elevated risk when governance systems are weak or overly centralized.

“Good governance structures are crucial for any company to thrive,” he said.